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MARYLAND'S DIRECTOR AND OFFICER LIABILITY
STATUTE OF 1988- INTRODUCTION TO
A SYMPOSIUM
Arnold Rochvargt
In February 1988 Maryland's Governor Schaefer signed emergency
legislation 1 permitting a corporation incorporated in Maryland to include in its articles of incorporation a provision eliminating any liability
of its directors and officers for money damages to the corporation or its
stockholders unless the director or officer received an improper personal
benefit or acted with active and deliberate dishonesty. 2 In light of the
controversy which surrounds limitation of director and officer liability
statutes in general, 3 and the Maryland statute in particular, this issue of
the University of Baltimore Law Review contains a symposium on Maryland's Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988.
The first article, "Let Stockholders Decide: The Origins of the
Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988" provides a useful introduction to the statute. Written by two practitioners, James J.
Hanks, Jr. and Larry P. Scriggins, both members of the Maryland State
Bar Association subcommittee which drafted the legislation, the article
sets forth the justifications for the statute, its legislative history, and its
operation. According to Messrs. Hanks and Scriggins, the justifications
for the statute include: (1) a crisis in the availability and cost of director
and officer (D&O) liability insurance; 4 (2) an increased willingness of the
courts to second-guess business decisions of corporate management; 5 and
(3) difficulty in attracting persons to serve on the boards of directors of
public corporations because of the fear of liability. 6 The article then re-

t
l.

2.
3.

4.
5.
6.

B.A., University of Pennsylvania; J.D., George Washington University School of
Law; Professor, University of Baltimore School of Law.
Act of Feb. 18, 1988, ch. 3, 1988 Md. Laws 739. Unlike most legislation in Maryland which is signed by the Governor after the legislative session, this legislation
was signed during the session and took effect immediately.
MD. CORPS. & Ass'NS. CODE ANN. § 2-405.2 (Supp. 1988). The 1988 legislation
also amended provisions of the Maryland General Corporation Law concerning indemnification of directors and officers. See id. § 2-418.
See, e.g., Hazen, Corporate Directors' Accountability: The Race to the Bottom The Second Lap, 66 N.C.L. Rev. 171 (1987); Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty
of Care, 42 SW. L.J. 919 (1988).
Hanks & Scriggins, Let Stockholders Decide: The Origins of the Maryland Director
and Officer Liability Statute of 1988, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 235, 235 (1989).
!d. at 235-37.
!d. at 237.
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views in detail the legislative history of the statute. In 1987 legislation
was proposed by the Bar Association Subcommittee to the Maryland
Legislature as a "self executing" as opposed to a "charter option" statute. The original proposal limited liability not only to the corporation
and its stockholders, but also to third parties. Its drafters maintained
that the proposed legislation would (1) discourage Maryland corporations from reincorporating in other states, 7 (2) encourage new incorporations in Maryland, 8 and (3) add to the perception that Maryland is a
state with a "favorable and responsible business climate." 9 Although the
Maryland Senate approved the bill, the House of Delegates Judiciary
Committee gave it an unfavorable report primarily because it limited
third-party actions and because it applied automatically to all Maryland
corporations without any shareholder vote. The 1987 bill was subsequently defeated by the full House of Delegates. 10
After some public outrage and threats from the expected beneficiaries of the defeated legislation to reincorporate outside of Maryland, 11
the Bar Association Subcommittee drafted a new bill and presented it to
the legislature. This bill did not automatically apply to all corporations;
instead it required shareholder approval. Moreover, it did not limit liability to third parties. The 1988 bill did, however, add officers to the
liability limitation, and expanded the range of improper conduct covered
by the liability limitation. This 1988 bill won easy approval in both the
Senate and House, and was signed by the Governor as emergency legislation on February 18, 1988.
In the final part of their article, Hanks and Scriggins discuss some of
the effects of the new statute. They contend that the new statute is not a
major expansion of shareholders' authority because sections of the Maryland General Corporation Law already permit shareholders to include
provisions in the articles of incorporation regulating the functioning of
their corporation. 12 They next discuss the very broad range of conduct
that can be protected from liability. The Maryland statute offers liability
protection from more misconduct than does the comparable Delaware
statute. 13 For example, directors and officers of Maryland corporations
can be absolved from liability even if their behavior constitutes intentional misconduct and self-dealing. Hanks and Scriggins justify the expansiveness of the Maryland statute as part of "the broad right of
stockholders to decide for themselves the allocation of the economic risk
of directors' or officers' misconduct." 14 The broad language of the Mary/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
13. /d.
14. /d.
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12.
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242-43.
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246-47.
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land statute, they argue, will promote clarity and certainty. 15
In conclusion, Hanks and Scriggins maintain that the new statute
will encourage competent persons to serve as directors and officers of
Maryland corporations, and will keep Maryland corporations from reincorporating elsewhere. 16 In addition, the statute will not lead to selfdealing or other misconduct because directors and officers still face liability from lawsuits by third parties, and exposure to lawsuits for equitable
relief by the corporation and its stockholders. 17 In sum, they conclude it
is a beneficial statute.
The second article, written by Professor Mark Sargent and entitled
"Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute,"
both praises and criticizes the statute. Professor Sargent believes that a
statute which permits shareholders to limit liability for directors' or officers' breach of duty of care is a useful means of aligning the interests of
shareholders and managers in public corporations. He is troubled, however, because the statute permits the corporation to limit liability for
breaches of duty of loyalty.
Sargent reminds us that despite some rhetoric to the contrary, the
imposition of money damages for breaches of duty of care is very rare,
and the courts' commitment to the business judgment rule has been "unbending."18 He believes this is the proper position for the courts. The
unwillingness of courts to review business decisions is an "expression of
the specialization of functions within the nexus of contracts encapsulated
in the public corporation." 19 Moreover, minimization of personal liability of directors for business decisions actually benefits shareholders because directors will not become excessively risk averse if they are
protected from liability. 20 Sargent argues that the courts' reluctance to
impose personal liability for breach of duty of care is further justified by
the fact that, unlike other professionals, directors cannot absorb the risk
of personal liability into the cost of doing business by charging clients a
price that reflects the risk. 21
Professor Sargent asks, however, why liability limitation statutes
such as Maryland's are needed if courts are so reluctant to impose personal liability on directors for breaches of duty of care? Although one
explanation is that these statutes exist because of a decline in the availability and affordability of D&O insurance, Sargent questions the existence of any fundamental change in the law of director liability that
would justify any radical change in the cost or availability of D&O insur/d. at 240.
/d. at 252.
/d.
Sargent, Two Cheers for the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute, 18 U.
BALT. L. REV. 278, 286 (1989).
19. /d. at 288.
20. /d.
21. /d. at 289.
15.
16.
17.
18.
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ance. 22 Unlike other commentators, Sargent does not go so far as to argue that director and officer liability limitation statutes are really
insurance industry protection statutes. 23 He believes instead that the ultimate motivation for the enactment of such statutes is a general sense of
uncertainty about the direction of the law among corporate management,
their counsel and their insurers. 24 The Maryland statute mitigates that
uncertainty and helps ensure that the risk of liability for breaches of duty
of care will continue to be insignificant. The Maryland statute is therefore worthy of some praise.
On the other hand, as Sargent points out, the Maryland statute differs from its Delaware counterpart by permitting limitation of liability
for breaches of duty of loyalty. Although some have suggested that the
distinction between duty of care and duty of loyalty is not a useful one, 25
Sargent disagrees. He believes that judicial monitoring of duty of loyalty
violations can be effective (as opposed to judicial monitoring of duty of
care) because courts are capable of deciding issues of fairness and honesty,26 and because duty of loyalty cases often involve concealment of
crucial facts. 27 Because the Maryland statute treats duty of care and
duty of loyalty identically, i.e., it permits the limitation of liability for
breaches of both duties, Sargent concludes that the Maryland statute is
"misguided" and finds the Delaware statute preferable. 28
Finally, Sargent discusses the implications of the statute for closely
held corporations. He concludes that a statute limiting liability for
breaches of duty of care in a closely held corporation is "largely innocuous."29 Loyalty issues, however, are important in close corporations.
Eliminating liability for breaches of duty of loyalty in a closely held corporation therefore is undesirable. 30 In sum, Sargent's review of the .
Maryland statute is a mixture of praise and criticism.
In his article, "Consent, Exit, and the Contract Model of the Corporation," Professor Dennis R. Honabach also gives the new legislation a
mixed review. After reviewing various aspects of the statute, and pointing out that the statute will have no effect on a disgruntled shareholder
who petitions a court to enjoin or rescind a board's decision, 31 Honabach
criticizes the drafters' justifications for the Maryland statute and finds all
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

/d. at 290-95.
/d.
/d. at 294.
See, e.g., Fischel & Bradley, The Role of Liability Rules and the Derivative Suit in
Corporate Law: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 261
(1986).
Sargent, supra note 18, at 298.
Id. at 299.
/d.
/d. at 306.
/d. at 307.
Honabach, Consent, Exit, and the Contract Model of the Corporation-A Commentary on Maryland's New Director and Officer Liability Limiting and Indemnification
Legislation, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 310, 312-17 (1989).
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of them flawed. He argues that although the compensation paid to directors and officers is insignificant relative to their risks, responsibilities, and
potential liability, the amount of compensation is irrelevant and the imposition of liability is fair so long as they understand the risks involved
before assuming the job. 32 In response to the argument that absent a
liability limitation statute fewer persons will be willing to serve on boards
of directors, Honabach maintains that private agreements can offer sufficient protection, and, moreover, that there is no proof of a "talent"
shortage. 33 He disputes the argument that the statute will aid the economy of Maryland by reducing the incentive for Maryland corporations to
reincorporate elsewhere, arguing that no nexus exists between the soundness of a state's economy and the number of corporations incorporated
there. 34 Moreover, because most Maryland corporations are small, local
businesses, it is very unlikely that they would reincorporate elsewhere.
Finally, Honabach questions the rationale that the new statute can be
justified as empowering shareholders to fashion their own governance
rules. 35 For example, the new provisions do not in all instances permit
the elimination of personal liability of directors and officers for money
damages to the corporation and its stockholders, nor does it permit elimination of lawsuits seeking equitable relief. In sum, Honabach concludes
that the Maryland statute cannot be supported by the reasons offered by
its drafters.
Honabach does however, believe that in some aspects, the new statute can be supported by the contract theory of corporations. The contract theory views the corporation as a nexus of contracts. 36 Where one
of the parties to such contracts - shareholders - are for the most part
capable of protecting their own interests. Under the contract theory,
corporate governance rules are best determined not by legislatively or
judicially imposed rules but through the private bargaining process
among the corporate participants. 37 Furthermore, because governance
rules are public information, the price of a share of stock will reflect all
information about the corporation, including its governance rules. 38 In
most instances, shareholders displeased with the rules adopted can sell
their shares and invest in corporations with different rules. Therefore, a
shareholder who retains his stock or purchases stock can be deemed to
consent to whatever rules the state or the other shareholders adopt.
Even under the contract theory, Honabach sees problems with the
Maryland statute because the Maryland statute applies to shareholders
who cannot be deemed to have consented to its provisions. 39 Although
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.

/d.
/d.
/d.
/d.
!d.
!d.
!d.
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at
at
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321-24.
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333.
334.

/d. at 337.
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sometimes a shareholder will be deemed to have consented to the governance rules through his purchase or retention of stock, Honabach maintains that a shareholder cannot be deemed to have consented to certain
fundamental unforeseeable changes in the governance rules such as the
elimination of liability for breach of duty of care and duty of loyalty. 40
Moreover, a shareholder who continues to hold his shares can be deemed
to consent only if he could otherwise sell his shares. But this is not true
with respect to shareholders in closely held corporations. Thus, even
under the contract theory of corporations, the statute should not be applied to closely held corporations. 41 Honabach suggests that the statute
be amended so that it applies only to shareholders who consent to the
new governance rules. He suggests that one solution would be to grant
the appraisal remedy to those dissenting shareholders whose corporations adopt a liability limitation provision pursuant to the statute. 42
In their article "Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the Corporation and the New Maryland Officer-Director Liability Provisions,"
Professors Henry N. Butler and Larry E. Ribstein also discuss the contract theory of corporations under the Maryland statute and, although
they too express reservations about it under the contract theory, they
believe that granting more contractual freedom to corporate participants
will help solve the director liability problem. 43 They therefore suggest
that legislatures fully adopt the contract theory of corporations and give
free rein to private parties to draft managerial contracts. 44 The costs of
judicially enforced fiduciary duties may far exceed the benefits of control~
ling managerial misconduct and, thus, it may make more economic sense
for shareholders to contract away completely the right to sue directors
for breaches of fiduciary duty. 45 Moreover, judicially imposed governance rules may cause management to act more conservatively than shareholders desire. 46 Judicial second-guessing of corporate decisions also
creates significant error cost.47 In any event, according to Butler and
Ribstein, the proper remedy is for the parties themselves to privately
fashion their own rules. The fact that the parties bear the costs themselves creates the greatest incentive to adopt efficient rules. Private ordering, not mandatory legal rules, Butler and Ribstein maintain, leads to
optimal corporate arrangements. 48
Butler and Ribstein praise the statute for permitting shareholders to
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

/d. at 339-40.
/d. at 344.
Id. at 346-51.
Butler & Ribstein, Free at Last? The Contractual Theory of the Corporation and the
New Maryland Officer-Director Liability Provisions, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 352, 353
(1989).
/d.
/d. at 358.
/d. at 356.
Id. at 357.
Id. at 358.
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limit liability for breaches of duty of loyalty as well as breaches of duty of
care. 49 They criticize the statute, however, for denying shareholders the
right to limit liability for acts involving improper personal benefit or acts
which constitute active and deliberate dishonesty. These exceptions are
criticized not only because they create ambiguities in the statute, 50 but
also because shareholders should be given the option to contract away all
liability of directors and officers to them if the shareholders so choose. 51
Butler and Ribstein are also troubled that the statute only applies to lawsuits seeking money damages, but not equitable relief. They believe that
shareholders should be permitted to waive equitable claims as well. To
the extent the statute permits private ordering of rights, it is desirable;
however Butler and Ribstein conclude that the Maryland statute falls
short of completely permiting private ordering of such rights.
To the extent the Maryland statute is consistent with the contract
theory of corporations, it is criticized by Professor Zwier in his article "Is
the Maryland Director-Officer Liability Statute Based on a Male-Oriented Ethical Model?", Zwier prefers the trust theory of corporationswhere managers have an obligation to act selflessly for the benefit of
others, especially those less able to protect themselves. 52 Rather than the
self-interested, adversarial bargaining process which is the crux of the
contract theory, the trust theory is based on the premise that the parties
are not adversarial, but seek to help each other. 53 Zwier argues that the
contract theory is not appropriate to corporate governance rules because
it presumes relationships of roughly equal power between persons who
are fully informed and aware of all possible risks at the beginning of the
relationship. 54 In the corporate setting, however, Zwier believes that
management is in a far superior position because it controls access to
information and the day-to-day operations of the corporation. The typical shareholder is a passive shareholder and depends on management
much like a child depends on a parent. 55 Therefore, a model emphasizing care and loyalty, rather than private bargaining, is appropriate. According to Zweir, the Maryland statute's elimination of the duty of care
and duty of loyalty will be detrimental to shareholders, especially those
with little business experience and those occupying minority positions in
closely held corporations. 56 By validating an adversarial relationship between management and shareholders, the statute will also have a negative impact on the working atmosphere for management. 57 Insofar as the
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

/d. at 362.
/d. at 363.
/d. at 363-64.
Zwier, Is the Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute Based on a Male-Oriented Ethical Model?, 18 U. BALT. L. REV. 368, 369 (1989).
!d. at 370.
/d. at 3.72.
/d. at 370.
/d. at 379.
/d.

232

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 18

Maryland statute reflects a contract rather than a trust theory of corporations, Zwier concludes it is undesirable.
The final article in the Symposium, "Nonprofit Corporations and
Maryland's Director and Officer Liability Statute: A Study of the
Mechanics of Maryland's Statutory Corporate Law," is a student comment on the application of the new liability limitation statute to nonprofit
corporations. After analyzing certain ambiguities and uncertainties in
the statute's language and legislative history, the comment concludes
that although the statute applies to nonprofit corporations, 58 its application to those corporations may not be desirable because of the incompatibility of the contract theory with nonprofit corporations. 59 The comment
suggests that the legislature should amend the statute so that it does not
apply to nonprofit corporations.

****
This Symposium provides a careful and critical analysis of the
Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988. Only the drafters of the legislation indicate unqualified support for it. Each of the other
authors express reservations.
Certain issues seem especially troublesome. Legislation aimed at encouraging qualified persons to serve on boards of directors and aimed at
encouraging aggressive business decisions is laudable. The Maryland
statute, however, does not entirely accomplish these goals; instead it
leaves directors and officers exposed to lawsuits from third parties and
still permits shareholder actions for equitable relief. Although the payment of money damages in most cases can be eliminated by a provision in
the articles of incorporation, the expense, loss of time and possible damage to reputation which may result from third party actions or injunctive
actions 60 will still act as a deterrent to service by some qualified persons.
If it is true as the statute's defenders suggest that the new statute will not
alter management decisionmaking and behavior, 61 it is unclear whether
the statute serves any useful purpose.
One impetus to the legislation was the large increases in premiums
for D&O insurance. 62 It is far from clear, however, whether these increases were justified, and whether the statute will lead to a rollback of
premiums. Very few cases seeking money damages from directors or officers are successful. Unlike, for example, medical malpractice insurance
where the insurance industry can point to recent large jury verdicts
against insureds as a justification for increased premiums, there has not
58. Comment, Nonprofit Corporations and Maryland's Director and Officer Liability
Statute: A Study of the Mechanics of Maryland's Statutory Corporate Law, 18 U.
BALT. L. REV. 384, 401 (1989).
59. /d. at 399-400.
60. Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 237.
61. /d. at 252.
62. /d. at 236-37.
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been a similar experience with D&O insurance. The problem may be
with the insurance industry, not with the corporate governance rules.
Concern is also caused by the statute's exceptions denying to the
corporation the ability to limit liability if a director or officer received an
improper personal benefit, and if a director or officer acted with active
and deliberate dishonesty. The vagueness and ambiguity of these two
exceptions will likely give rise to much litigation. Eschewing the exceptions and language of the Delaware statute in Maryland's attempt to
"out-Delaware Delaware" deprives corporate counsel and Maryland
courts from reliance on what will most likely be the largest body of case
law on this issue, i.e., Delaware's. 63
Although it is difficult to argue with the proposition that individuals
should be able to bargain for the terms of their own relationships, it is
not certain that this Maryland statute expands the ability of shareholders
and management to define their relationship beyond what the Maryland
statute provided before the new legislation. 64 Even before this new statute, courts had not interfered in corporate matters in circumstances
where the parties had defined their own rights and liabilities. Nor did the
courts suggest any interest in doing so in the future.
Much was made in the Maryland legislature about the undesirability
of a self-executing statute. The original 1987 legislation which was selfexecuting was defeated. Most commentators believe, however, that it
makes no difference whether a limitation of liability statute is self-executing or not because shareholders, when given the choice, overwhelmingly
approve limitation of liability provisions because they invariably approve
almost all proposals requested by management. 65 The legislative battle
over the self-executing nature of the 1987 proposal, therefore, was most
likely irrelevant in terms of affording shareholders additional protection.
It should be remembered that liability limitation statutes are enacted
not by persons who have decided to adopt a particular economic or ethical model, but rather by legislators and governors who are, above all else,
politicians. Therefore Maryland's liability limitation statute should also
be looked at from a political policy making point of view. Under this
approach, certain issues create interest. What is the proper reaction of a
legislature to threats by prominent local businesses to reincorporate in
other states, especially when considering that a business' place of incorporation, although perhaps having·an impact on certain special interest
63. The desirability of being able to rely on precedents from other states with comparable statutes was acknowledged by the drafters of the original legislation in 1987. !d.
at 237-38. Curiously, the states that the drafters looked to for guidance were Louisiana and Indiana. !d.
64. Hanks & Scriggins, supra note 4, at 246.
65. Honabach, supra note 36, at 331-32. There has been a slight trend away from shareholder passivity by institutional investors, however, when asked to approve certain
anti-takeover defenses suggested by management.
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groups within that state, 66 has a minimal impact on the general condition
of the state's economy? What quantum and quality of evidence should
the legislature require in deciding whether a director and officer liability
"crisis" exists? If no crisis exists, why has this been used as a justification
for the statute? What was the "emergency" that convinced the legislature and the Governor that unlike most legislation, this legislation should
take effect immediately? 67
This legislation also presents the interesting question of the proper
role of local bar associations in promoting legislation. Is there any way
to determine whether bar association subcommittees are acting as advocates of the public interest or as advocates of the interests of particular
clients? Should full disclosure of client lists be required of those who
serve on such bar association subcommittees?
The Maryland Director and Officer Liability Statute of 1988 was
portrayed to the legislature and the public as crucial to the economic
well-being of the state. There is some question whether this is true. Perhaps the Maryland liability limitation statute can be best understood as a
symbol that Maryland will cooperate with business and its advocates so
that jobs are kept in Maryland. Even though the liability limitation statute itself may not have a direct impact on jobs in Maryland, the symbolic
value it carries may bear an indirect impact. Viewed from this perspective, the gesture of enacting this statute may be more important than its
actual operation.

66. Macey & Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware Corporation Law, 65
TEXAS L. REV. 469 (1987).
67. See, e.g., Note, Agency Discretion to Accept Comment in Informal Rulemaking:
What Constitutes "Good Cause" Under the Administrative Procedure Act?, 1980
B.Y.U. L. REv. 93 (1981) (discussing when good cause exists to make administrative regulations effective without thirty-day waiting period).

